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CORRIGENDill1  : 
page  16  (last paracraph) 
"· •••  133  millions gallons  of wine  into alcohol" 
instead of "..... 176  millions  Gallons  of wine  into industrial alcohol". 
++++++ 
MITTEILUNGEN  ZUR  GEMEINSAMEN  AGRARPOLITIK 
BERICHTIGUNG: 
Seite 16,  Absatz 7,  zu  lesen: 
- NR.  5  Juni  J..li.J 
"Dies  flihrte  dazu,  dass  1974  ohra 6  Millionen Hektoli ter Wein  zu Alkohol 
destillicrt wurden"  anstelle von "etwa 176  Millionen Gallonen Wein  zu 
Industriealkohol. •• " 
+++++++ 
Landbouw  Bulletin  Juni  1975 
ERRATUM 
Blz.  16,  alincn 7,  lees: 
"Het  gcvolg hiervan was  dat  in 1974  ongeveer  6  miljoen hl.  wijn ton 
alcohol werd gestilleerd" 
i.p.v.  "ongeveer  176  miljocn gallon Hijn tot technische alcohol. ••••  " 
+++++++ 
Nouvcllec  de  la PAC  Numero  5  juin 1975 
RECTIFICATIF 
A la  pa~e 19  (3eme  paragraphc)  lire 
" ••••  en 1974  la distillation d'environ 6  millions hectolitres de  vin 
en alcool"  au  lieu  de  " ......  d'environ 390.000 hectolitres en alcool 
industriel" 
+++++++++ 
NOTIZIE  SULLA  POLITICA  AGRICOLA  COMUNE  Giurrno  1975 
RETTIFICA 
Alla paljina 16  lcggere. 
"Nel  1974  la distillazione di  circa 6  milioni  di  cttolitri  di  yin.Q  in 
alcolc."  invece  di  "···· di  circa 176  milioni  di  galloni divino in 
alcole ad uso  industriale". -1-
I 
I  INTRODUCTION I 
THE  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY 
SERVES  FARMERS  AND  CONSUMERS  IN 
A TIME  OF  ECONOMIC  INSTABILITY. 
For the last two  years most  basic foods  have  cost  less in the  Common 
Market  than in most  other parts of the developed world.  Since the 
disastrously bad world harvests  of 1972,  wheat  - one  of the basic 
ingredients of almost all human  foods  - has  cost  an  average 30 per 
cent less in the EEC  than on  the world market. 
This  cheapness  of EEC  produced grain has  played an  important  part  in 
the stabilisation of European  food prices.  While  countries which  depend 
on  imports for their grain for feeding people and animals  have  had to 
pay more  and more  for their supplies and their food  prices have  conse-
quently risen,  food prices in most  EEC  member  States have risen less. 
Similar beneficial differences  can  also be  seen between  EEC  and  world 
prices for other basic foods.  The  Community  export  control  system has 
kept  down  the price of sugar and olive oil too.  World  olive oil prices 
in the 1972-74  period have  been  as  much  as  70  per cent  above  Community 
prices and during 1974  sugar has been five times the Community  price on 
world markets. 
And  even though bad weather  has  seriously affected the  Community's 
ability to be self-sufficient in sugar,  the Commission  has  subsidised 
imports  during the 1974-75  season so as to maintain  prices at  the 
Community  level. -2-
In addition to these price advantages resulting from  a  self-sufficient 
agriculture,  it has been Community  policy to subsidise the sales of 
butter and beef - both generally and through special  schemes  for  nee~ 
sections of the Community. 
During 1974  the Community  has  made  available special subsidies on both 
beef and butter which has allowed pensioners  and  people receiving so-
cial welfare benefits to obtain both beef and butter at half the  normal 
price.  These  schemes  have been operated at the discretion of national 
governments  in Britain,  Ireland,  France and Germany.  British consumers 
have also had the benefit  of low-priced butter from  EEC  suppliers 
through the working of the EEC's  monetary  compensation  system  on  farm 
trade. 
Of  course,  EEC  food  prices are not  always  belo•r those  on  the world 
market.  To  support  farmers  incomes  at  a  level which  ensures that  they 
produce  adequate  supplies for the years  of shortage,  it is necessary 
to  pay  them prices which are often above  world prices in the years  of 
surplus.  Only  by  supporting farmers  incomes  in this way  can supplies 
be  guaranteed. 
The  basic aim  of this support  is to  ensure  guaranteed supplies of food 
for the European  housewife.  This  security of  supply is one  of tho major 
aims  of Europe's  Common  Agricultural Policy.  It is achieved through 
supporting the market  prices of farm  products at levels which  ensure 
that farmers  keep  producing '1-li thout  being throrm  out  of business by 
violent falls in market  prices.  At  the  same  time,  the  same  system is 
designed to ensure that  shortages  do  not raise prices  so high that 
housewives  cannot  afford to buy. 
The  major aim  of the CAP  is thus to deliver adequate  and regular supplies 
of food to the  shops at reasonable  prices.  This  aim  is achieved through 
the stable markets  for major foods  Hhich  can  only be  obtained by  giving 
food producers  long term  guarantees. 
The  lack of such a  policy in other major agricultural producing coun-
tries,  '1-tas  a  major factor causing the  shortages and high food  prices 
of the last  tHo  years. -3-
Because price guarantees to farmers  in the United States,  Canada  and 
Australia - the world's major grain produoing areas - were  inadequate, 
they deliberately cut  down  their production in 1972.  Years  of uncon-
trolled surplus production and  poor prices forced them  to make  this 
decision. 
Unfortunately,  their decisions  coincided with bad harvests in all parts 
of the world. 
No  one  would  of course pretend that the European  farm  policy is perfect. 
Though  clearly capable of guaranteeing supplies of grain,  dairy products, 
and meat,  it has  also created surpluses of these products. 
It is however  extremely difficult to bring agricultural production in 
any  country or group of countries into  exact balance with market  demand. 
Indeed,  due  to the dependence  of agriculture  on  the weather,  plant  and 
animal  diseases  and  other factors too often beyond human  control,  pro-
duction aims  must  always  be set higher than actual need in order to 
insure against  shortage. 
And  in an  EEC  context  there is also the problem of a  still small  peasant 
farm  type of rural  economy  in many  parts of the Community.  This  inevi-
tably means  wider fluctuations  in production than in the more  indus-
trialised type of agriculture in countries with a  basically industrial 
social structure such as  the United States. 
The  CAP  has  however  only been in operation for ten years;  it is there-
fore  obvious that time is needed for its market  management  mechanisms 
to be perfected and  even  more  time  needed for the structural problems 
of the  EEC  farm  industry to be resolved. 
The  fact  remains,  that the  Common  Agricultural Policy enables the EEC 
to guarantee  consumers  adequate  supplies of basic foods  through periods 
of  extreme scarcity in the rest  of the world.  But  to the uninformed 
observer the 3 1400  million unit  of account  (4.5 billion US  dollars) 
cost  of this support  seems  excessive. - 1-
Compared  to support  of agriculture in other countries,  however,  this 
cost is not  high.  Despite the  lack of effective price guarantees  to 
the  US  farmer for  example,  agricultural  support  in tho United States 
costs the citizen approximately twice what  it costs his Community 
counterpart. 
II 
I  EEC  SELF-SUFFICIENCY I 
The  CAP  guarantees  the Community  farmers  a  price for their produce which 
encourages  them  to produce sufficient quantities of grains,  dairy pro-
ducts,  meat  and other basic foods  to satisfy practically all the  demand 
within the Community.  This means  that in times  of shortage,  the EEC 
consumer has protection from  the rapid increases in food prices suf-
fered by countries which  depend heavily on  imports for food  supplies. 
The  Community  is almost  self-sufficient in the main  basic foods.  The 
EEC  produces all its own  dair,y  products,  all the barley needed for 
animal  feeding,  95  per cent  of the wheat  used in bread and confectiona-
r,y  making and all ito own  pig meat,  poultr,y meat  and  eggs.  The  Commu-
nity is 90  per cent  self-sufficient in wine,  94  per cent  self-sufficient 
in the main  types  of fresh vegetables.  The  EEC  also produces  76  per cent 
of its own  fresh  deciduous fruit  but  only 34  per cent  of its citrus 
fruits.  Beef production,  due  to the rapid increases in output  during 
the last hm years,  is likely to equal  consumption during 1975. 
Despite  the variety and  plenty of EEC  agricultural production,  the 
Community  still has  to  import  animal  feed  grains  such as maize  and 
soya and  a  wide  range  of fruits,  vegetables  and other foods  which 
cannot  bo  grown  in Europe. 
This plenty is in marked  contras't  to other parts of the world.  And 
lack of a  proper agricultural support  system - particularly in tho 
industrialised countries - in  one  of the main  reason why  the world is - il-
currently critically short  of food.  Farmers  in the United States,  in 
Canada,  Australia and South America cut back their production in 
1971-72  because  they felt their incomes  and their future threatened 
by  surpluses. 
European agriculture and Horld agricultural trade. 
Despite the popular view that  the  EEC  io  a  protected agricultural mar-
ket  designed to  exclude food  from  third countries,  the Community  is 
still the world's  largest buyer of food  from  third countriez. 
In 1973  the  Community  accounted for 43.09 per cent  of total world 
agricultural  imports.  In certain oectors EEC  imports are  even higher 
than this average  suggests.  EEC  imports of fruit,  vegetables  and ani-
mal  feeding-stuffs represent more  than 80  per cent  of total interna-
tional  trade  in those  commodities. 
The  CAP  and world food  security. 
The  grain harvest  of 1972,  in terms  of total world output  was  one  of 
the worst  in living memory.  Harvests  were  particularly bad in countries 
which  in any  case normally  import  large quantities of grain - principally 
Russia,  China and India.  There Has  consequently  a  very  heavy  demand 
for  grain imports.  Total  world stocks of wheat  fell by  60 per cent. 
Inevitably,  this reduction  in supplies has  caused a  severe inflation 
of food prices.  Export  prices for  U.S.  wheat,  a  major indicator of 
world  grain prices,  rose  from  60  dollars  (U.s.)  to  220  dollars  a  ton 
in the June  1972  to February  1974  period.  Export  prices for  U.S.  maize -
a  major  component  of  animal  feeds  - rose from  56  dollars to  131  dollars 
a  ton in the  same  period. 
All basic food  prices,  because they are  linked to cereal prices in some 
form  or other,  have  rioen by  similar amounts. -6-
In this period the advantages  of the  EEC  system  have  become  apparent. 
The  price of wheat  on  the main  EEC  markets  in December  1974  was  154 
dollars a  ton  compared with 234  dollars  a  ton  on  world markets. 
The  effect of the operation of the  EEC  market  management  system has 
been  even  more  spectacular in the case of sugar.  Sugar prices rose 
rapidly all through  1974:  when  they  reached their peak of 1080 dollars 
the EEC  price was  still only 336  dollars  a  ton.  The  adequate  supplies 
of grain and dairy products  produced within the  EEC  has also allowed 
the Community  to play its part in the world food aid programme. 
Throughout  a  period when  most  other countries were  cutting down  their 
aid contributions,  the Community  has been able to maintain and increase 
its food aid. 
During the 1974-75  period the Community  is likely to  have  contributed 
some  1.5 million tons  of wheat  to food aid.  Due  to its large dairy 
industry,  the Community  is now  the only oupplier of milk powder  to 
world food aid schemeo.  In 1974-75  the EEC  is likely to be  sending 
120,000 tons of milk  powder  for  infant feeding in famine  stricken 
areas  of the world. 
The  maintenance  of the necessary production and reserves  of grain and 
dairy products  to  insure against  food price inflation and to maintain 
contributions to world food  aid is now  Community  policy. 
The  EEC,  in common  with other major  food  producing countries,  played 
an  important part  in setting up  the "World Food  Council"  at the World 
Food  Conference  in November  1974.  It is hoped that over the next  few 
years the EEC  will collaborate with other producers  under tho Council 
umbrella to set up  an international  system of food buffer stocks to 
protect  the  world from  the  ravages  of famine. 
Although  no  one  would  pretend that  the setting up  of this world food 
security system is going to be  easy,  the  system  cannot  even be  contem-
plated vrithout  large reserves of foodstuffs being built up  in the  EEC 
and other food  producing areas. - 7-
Commission  action holds  down  food  prices. 
Protection against  food price inflation has  resulted from  deliberate 
action of the Commission  to prevent  Community-produced grain and 
other basic  foods  from  flowing out  of the European market  and  into 
the much  higher-priced world market. 
During the twelve months  up to January  1975  the price of wheat  within 
the  EEC  was  an  average  30  per cent  below the  world market  rate.  Through-
out  this period there  Has  a  complete  reversal of  EEC  levy policy to 
achieve this effect.  Normally,  the  EEC  import  regulation system  imposes 
levies to raise the price of imported food  and thus  protect  the prices 
of  EEC  farmers  on  Community  markets. 
In tho  1973-74  period,  however,  the reverse  has  been tho  case with 
export  levies  (taxes)  being imposed to make  export  of EEC  produced 
grains unattractive to tho European trader.  Tho  same  system has  also 
been  operated to prevent  exports of sugar.  This  has  meant  that it has 
alv1ays  been more  profitable to sell grain and  sugar within the Commu-
nity than to export.  In this way,  tho  price  of  food to the  EEC  consu-
mer  has  been effectively kept  down. 
III 
AGRICULTURAL  TRADE  PROBLll1S  CAUSED  BY 
LACK  OF  WORLD  FAill<l  COMr.!ODITY  AGRID1ENTS 
The  alleged ill-effects of  EEC  farm  policy have arisen from  tho  general 
lack of uorld agricultural  commodity  agreements  rather than from  the 
direct  effects of the  CAP. 
If other major  food  producing nations  and  trading blocks  had  given 
their farmers  the  degree  of support  that the  EEC  has  provided,  accep-
ted the fact  that  vrorld  food  security can  only  come  from  proper price -8-
guarantees to farmers  and been prepared to work for world-wide  food 
trade agreements,  there would not  be  the crucial shortage of food that 
currently exists. 
Current  world-wide  food price inflation and the  lack of surpluses to 
provide  food aid to the hungry  nations of the world is with us  now 
mainly because  of the lack of  such  guarantees  and agreement. 
In order to rationalise world trade  in the main  food  products,  the 
Community  is currently studying the problems  of setting up  interna-
tional buffer stocks for  grains,  dairy products  and  sugar.  It is also 
taking an active part in GATT  negotiations designed to established new 
international trade agreements  for  each of the major  food products. 
The  Common  Farm  Policy protects the  consumer  as  'I'TCll  as the farmer. 
Convinced critics of the  Common  Agricultural Policy will of course 
argue  that  though the  common  farm  policy has protected the  European 
consumer  from  the \'TOrst  effects of food price inflation during the 
last  two  years,  there is no  guarantee that this situation is going 
to continue.  "What  happens  when  the situation returns  to "normal" 
and  surpluses of food  again become  available on  the world market?" 
is an  obvious question. 
The  obvious  answer is that there is no  guarantee that things will 
ever be the  same  again.  Demand  for major foods  has  increased from 
countries  such  as  Russia,  Japan and China and these countries  have 
the hard cash to buy  on  world markets. 
Meat  consumption  in Russia and Japan,  for  example,  has  increased by 
20  and 15  per cent  respectively over the last four years.  Russian 
purchases  of grain on  world markets  in the crucial  1972-73  harvest 
season vmre  30 million tons - three times  any  previous level. 
In 1973  there was  an  exceptional harvest  and many  countries including 
Russia and the  EEC  were  able to keep  down  their demand  for  grains. -9-
Bad  harvests in 1974  again,  however,  forced many  countries  including 
Russia to  look to the world market  for  food supplies.  This has  added 
fresh fuel  to the  inflationary fires. 
Changed  demand  and supply conditions. 
There  are two  important  points about  this situation.  The  first is that 
countries  such as Russia and China now  have  the money  to be  able to 
buy  food off the world market  whenever  they need it. 
It is unlikely that for many  years  these  two  major food  consuming 
countries will have  the necessary agricultural productive capacity 
to become  independent  of the  world market. 
The  second  important  point is that the price at  which the  farmers  of 
the world are prepared to produce  food is much  higher than it was  in 
the days  of surplus prior to 1972.  The  energy crisis has raised the 
costs of farmers'  major inputs - fuel,  fertiliser,  pesticides and 
machinery.  Increasing scarcity of  labour  in the  main agricultural 
producing nations is also raising costs.  Farmers  in the  United States, 
Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand and  South America therefore must  have 
higher prices if they are to continue filling the  shopping baskets 
of  th~ uorld.  One  thing is certain:  farmers  are not  going to  produce 
food at cut-rate prices for anyone,  anymore. 
Farmers  in the United States  and  other exporting countries need price 
and market  guarantees  just as much  as  EEC  farmers.  Inevitably,  they 
are  going to exploit  the current  shortage situation to get  them  so 
that it is unlikely that food  will  ever again be cheap.  For this rea-
son  the  CAP  is likely to  prove  a  long-term boon  to the European  con-
sumer. 
Even  if uorld food  production  increases sufficiently to meet  increased 
demand,  the  world agricultural trade situation is likely to make  it 
imperative that  the Community  maintains  a  self-sufficient agricultural 
industry. - 10-
New  international agricultural trade agreements  currently being formu-
lated will also  inevitably mean  a  high level of prices in the  future. 
The  US  government  has  made  it clear that it does  not  intend to bear 
the cost of beinl:j the \·mrld' s  food  stockholder.  The  general  run-down 
of US  food  stocks  and the refusal of the Americans  to rebuild them, 
must  inevitably mean  that countries  and trading groups like the  EEC 
must  maintain their own  production and carry  over stocks as  an  insu-
rance  against bad harvests. 
IV 
BASIC  AIMS  OF  CQI.lMON  FARM  POLICY  ACHIEVED J 
In this situation of Horld  food  shortage  therefore the  Common  Farm 
Policy is achieving one  of its major aims  as  set  out  in the Rome 
Treaty:  the  guarantee  of regular supplies of  food at reasonable 
prices. 
Problems  however  remain  in  achieving the  fulfillment  of the other 
three major  objects of the  CAP:  the  stabilisation of markets,  increa-
sing agricultural productivity  and the  guarantee  of  a  fair standard 
of living for farmers  and  farm  ~rorkers. 
The  current  problem ui  th the oversupply  of beef - immediately  follov1ing 
a  period of  extreme  shortage - is  one  obvious  area where  market  stabi-
lisation has not  been  achieved.  With  other products,  Hhere  the Commu-
nity is self-sufficient - such as butter and  pigmeat  - similar problems 
of potential over and under  supply  exist. 
The  Commission  and Council  are  only  too  well  aware  of these problems. 
The  political and  economic  ntructure  of the  Community  at present  prevents - ll -
the  introduction of price and market  management  policies which  would 
bring the supply  of these products  more  into balance with the consu-
mer  demand. 
The  current  economic  and social structure of EEC  agriculture is also 
a  major barrier to  improvements  in agricultural productivity. 
As  the Commission  has  pointed out  many  times - but  most  recently in 
the Memorandum  on the Future Development  of Agriculture 1973-1978 
(November  1973)  long term  improvements  in agricultural productivity 
can be  achieved only through separating support  of agricultural prices 
from  measures  aim~d at  improving agricultural structure. 
This  involves  acceptance  of the  idea that the many  small  farmers  in 
the  Community- 78  per cent  of the  farms  in the EEC,  5.4  million of 
them,  are smaller than  20  hectares - cannot  obtain a  reasonable  living 
solely through  support  of market  prices for their produce. 
Retirement,  farm  amalgamations,  and direct  income  support  under  such 
structural  improvement  schemes  as  the hill farm  policy will increa-
singly provide for these farmers.  The  Commission's  aim  is then to  on-
courage  the  Gouncil  increasingly to make  price adjustments  which are 
based  on  the  income  needs  of efficient farmers.  More  efficient agri-
cultural producers  in any  case  form  the larger productive section of 
the  industry  (although only  22  per cent  of  EEC  farms  are larger than 
20  hectares,  these  larger farms  account  for 70  per cent  of the  farmed 
land). 
This process will,  in tho  longer term,  inevitably involve  a  steady 
reduction  in the  guarantee  costs  of FEOGA,  even  though total FEOGA 
costs are likely to increase through the  greater demand  for money  from 
tho  guidance  section of the fund. - 12-
Improvements  in A6£icultural Productivity. 
There  have  in  any  cane  been  steady  improvements  in the structure of 
EEC  agriculture over the last decade.  Despite the  large number  of 
small  farms,  almost  40  per cent  of the Community's  cultivable lund 
is occupied by  farms  larger than  50  hectares  (120 acres).  This repre-
sents  a  considerable increase in tho  proportion of the Community's 
land area farmed  in larger units during the last decade. 
In 1960  only  22  per cent  of tho  land area was  in farms  greater than 
50  hectares.  Even  after making allowance  for  tho fact  that the  UK  -
Hith a  much  greater proportion of large farms  than other countries -
has  been  added to tho EEC,  this represents  a  considerable  advance. 
Similarly \rith  labour productivity.  In 1973  the  9.6 million  people 
employed  in agriculture represented 9 per cent  of the working popu-
lation.  Ton  years  ago  tho  proportion of the Community's  labour force 
employed  on  the  land vms  more  than  16  per cent. 
The  increase in the  number  of efficient  farms  and the efficiency of 
the  industry  in general  has  resulted in a  considerable  increase  in 
agricultural productivity.  Both output  per man  employed  and per 
cultivated hectare  have  increased markedly  during the  1966-1973 
period.  Output  per  mLJ.n  in this period increased by more  than 5 per 
cent  a  year while  output  per hectare has  increased at the rate of 
3.2  per cent  a  year. 
Principal advantages  and current  disadvantarr~s of tho  C.!!:. 
In the last  tvro  years the major  advantage  of the  CAP  has  been proved: 
the security against  HOrld  food  shortages  which  a  self-rmfficient 
production allows.  'l'his  advantage  has  not  been  gained hovrever  1-1i thout 
considerable financial,  social  and political cost. - 13-
The  major criticismGlcvclled against  the  CAP  arc that it costs too 
much,  that it is wasteful  and that  in times  of more  normal  agricul-
tural production it disrupts  the agricultural trade  of other countries. 
Though  the  farm  policy has  not yet  solved the problem of rural  poverty 
in many  parts  of the Community,  the  introduction of the hill farm 
("disfavourcd areas")  and regional policies will  complement  the  otruc-
tural aspects of the  CAP  in  improving  incomes  and living standards  in 
these areas. 
Failure to  get  demand  and supply in balance in some  sectors has 
steadily raised the costs of the farm  policy over the years.  Recurring 
dairy  surpluses,  particularly of butter,  have  cost  the farm  fund  an 
average  of 600  million u.a.  a  year during the last four years. 
The  cost  of beef marked  support  in the 1970  surplus year was  31  million 
u.a.  and again in 1974  the  cost  of disposing of  a  400,000 ton  surplus 
and other emergency  market  support  measures  is likely to reach more 
than 150  million u.a  ••  But  at the  same  time the high  level of cereal 
production Hhich the  EEC  farm  policy has  alHays  encouraged has7  during 
the current  shortage,  saved the Comm1mity'n  consumers  from  considerably 
worse  food price inflation than has  occurred elsewhere. 
It must  also  be  remembered that  an  increase in FEOGA  costs  in inevi-
table as the  CAP  develops,  since many  of the costs  of agricultural 
support  once  borne by  national  governments arc  gradually being trans-
ferred to Brussels. 
The  apparent  high cost  of the  FEOGA  budget  muot  also be balanced 
against  the cost  to consumers  and national balance of payments  if 
larger quantities of food  had to be  imported from  outside the Commu-
nity - particularly in periods of world shortage. 
Despite  the  advantages  of the  CAP,  hoHever,  the problem of recurrent 
surplw::cf:  remains  - particularly in the  dairy  product  and beef sectors. - 14-
There are also recurrent  problems  of surpluses of fruit  and  wine  in 
the Mediterranean area of the  Com~unity. 
Both beef and dairy  products  tend to form  the basic  income  of the 
many  medium  and  small  farmers  in the northern part  of the Community. 
There  are fundamental  differences in the  causes  of the beef and  dairy 
surpluses.  The  beef nurplus is caused by  fluctuations  in production 
in response to wide  variations  in price.  The  dairy surplus  problem is 
of a  more  long term nature because milk production forms  the major 
income  of  many  small  farmers. 
In the case of beef,  better alignment  of production Hith consumption 
Hill come  from  better management  of the market.  There is hope  that 
decisions taken in February  1975  on  a  more  permanent  support  of the 
beef market  m~ stabilise prices  and  encourage better longer term 
planning of production by  beef producers. 
The  dairy  product  surplus  problem can only be  reduced by  a  reduction 
in the  number  of small farmers. 
Similarly fruit  and trine  arc the  main  sources of  income  for  many  farmers 
in southern France  and Italy.  It is therefore very difficult  to devise 
support  policies Hhich will  eliminate the risk of recurrine excess pro-
duction. 
'rho  Commins ion  1 n  vievr is that  improvement  in the agricultural,  social 
and technical structure 'i!Ould  do  much  to  improve  the responsiveness 
of production to market  demand.  Independent  agricultural  experts 
argue,  houever,  that this improvement  in structure is not  enoueh. 
The  Community  is currently searching for new  market  management  methods 
that  guarantee the farmer  a  price for his products but  Hhich  do  not 
create surpluses  and shortages. 
Improved  far:n  and marketing structures vtill  in future  play an  important 
part  in the more  efficient  alignment  of food  production vrith  consump-- 15-
tion.  The  Commission  has  comlistently  pressecl the Council  of r>linintern 
to accept  the principle that  farm price adjustments must  be based on 
the  income  necd~l  c,f  the  efficient farmer,  rather than as  an  income 
prop for farmers  whoso  holdings  are  so  small that they  cannot  possibly 
win  a  living from  mc>rket  prices alone. 
The  setting up  of the  Fc:1rm  Accountancy  Netvrork  by the Commission  is an 
important part of this process  of aligning price adjustments  on  the 
efficient farmer. 
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I·!EDITERRANEAN  POLICY 
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Due  to  i tn  inclusion of largo areas of  agricul  tm·al  l<:md  in the r:lediter-
rtmenn  oree.,  tho European  Community  is able to provide  the major pro-
portion of its consumption  of si.ono  fruit,  olive oil,  Hine  and a  nubstnn-
tial proportion of its citrus fruit  needs.  It is also able to  produce 
D.  Hide  rL~ngo of vegetables  through  a.  longer season,  than is normally 
posnible  in northern Europe,  in the  nouthern half of Frtmce  and  in 
Italy. 
Production of  poaches  and citrus fruits han  remained stable for  seve-
ral years  now  and  in both  cases  provide more  than 30 per cent  of tho 
Commtmity' s  total consumption. 
In the other t•ro  major Hedi  torrn.nean  products - olive oil and  wine, 
alnost  D.ll  Community  consumption is satisfied b,y  its own  producers. 
Hith both  those  commodities  - duo  to their production being concen-
trn.tocl in tho  hnnds  of many  small  producers - there  are recurrent 
marketinr; D.nd  structural problems. 
'l'here  arc  more  than  n  million olive oil producers  in the  EEC  - 99  per 
cent  of  them  concontrG.tcd in Italy.  Because  of tho  heavy  labour roqui-
rcmenb~ of the oli  vc  oil crop,  the Community  consider::: it necesrw  .. ry - 16-
to maintain a  high level  of support  to producers.  It is also  a  sector 
where  there is very little scope for  increases  in productivity through 
technical improvement. 
The  Community  makes  an  exception to the main  line of the  Common  Farm 
policy for these  two  reasons  in operating a  system of direct  aids  to 
olive oil producers  in order to maintain production. 
The  wine  production of the EEC  represents more  than 60  per cent  of the 
"grands vinn"  conoumed  in the world.  The  product  of tho  Community's 
tHo  million wine  groHers  represents six per cent  of the total agricul-
tural production  (by value)  of the  enlarged EEC. 
The  aim  of the  EEC  wine  policy is to stabilise markets  by  maintaining 
production at  the level of demand  and at the  sa~c time to maintain 
and  improve quality. 
Due  to  tho critical role which the weather  pl~s in wine  production -
probably more  than in any  other sector including cerealo - these  aims 
have been difficult to achieve.  This  has been only too  well  demonstrated 
during the last  two  seasons. 
In 1972  the  small  harvest  of the middling quality wines  caused rocketing 
prices.  In the following year the situation was  completely reversed 
Hith  a  40 per cent  greater harvest.  Despite  improved quality,  prices 
crashed. 
The  range of wines  covered by  the support  policy covers wide  differences 
in quality.  This has  been the main  reason for the overproduction  of the 
low quality Hines.  This  has  resulted in the distillation in 1974  of an 
estimated 176  millions gallons  of wine  into industrial alcohol.  This 
operation is likely to cost  the  guarantee section of FEOGA  more  than 
112  million units of account  in 1974.  There  arc also likely to be 
additional costs for  storage premiums  and transport  of surplus  wine 
out  of the  producing arean  to the  processors.  The  overall result  is 
that  spending on  support  of the wine  market  in 1974 is expected to 
be  double the original  estimate. - 17-
The  Commission  is however  fully  conscious  of the special production 
and  structural problems - a  large number  of small  production units, 
high  costs  and wide  seasonal fluctuations  in yield - of the wine 
sector.  Community  policy is increasingly being directed towards  the 
encouragement  of the production of high quality wines. 
VI 
I  I/.!PORTANCE  OF  STRUCTURAL  POLICY I 
While  emphasising that the  current price support  mechanisms  are the 
only  ones that  can  work  in a  Community-wide  context,  the Commission 
has  always  pressed for the use  of direct aids in order to  improve 
farm  structures. 
The  Co~munity's agricultural structural policy now  has  four major 
instruments.  The  tvTO  most  important  - already being applied by member 
governments  - are the farm  modernisation Directive (called "Directive 
159")  and the farm  retirement  and pension Directive  ("Directive 160"). 
The  modernisation policy is aimed not  only at  making farms  larger, 
but,  much  more  important,  at making them  efficient  enough to  give the 
farmer  and his family  an  income  comparable  to hio  counterpart  working 
in other industries in the  same  region. 
In the  schemes  now  being applied in all member  States,  farmers  who 
produce  approved development  plans  receive  low  interest  loans  in 
order to  improve  land,  buildings  and  livestock.  There is also assis-
tance  in keeping farm  accounts.  Where  extra land is available,  farmers 
working under this  scheme  have  priority and aid in acquiring it to 
make  their farms  more  economically viable. 
The  modernisation directive therefore fits very  closely with the 
retirement  and pension  policy.  Many  of the  farms  given up  by  retiring - Ill-
farmers  play an  important  pa1·t  in enlarging and modernising the farms 
~1hich remain.  Under  the retirement  policy  1  farmers  in the  55  to 65 
year age  group  give up  farming in return for  an  annuity paid by  mem-
ber governments  with  YCOGA  assistance. 
Another  important  policy development  ~1hich compliments  the modernisa-
tion and  retirement  policies is the  occupational  guidance  policy 
(Directive 161)  for farming families.  Its principle aim  is to  provide 
advice  on  training in agriculture but  also to provide  advice to people 
Hho  may  leave agriculture and move  into other industries. 
An  accepted Heakness  of  the structural policies has  hoHever been the 
lack of structural planning at  the regional  level - within a  co-ordinated 
Community  policy. 
Regional  policy. 
The  rapid technical and  economic  change  that is taking place in agri-
culture- uith or uithout  the European  agricultural policy- must 
inevitably create rural unemployment  and the  run-down  of rural  commu-
nities.  There  are also  large areas  of the  Community  where  the rural 
social  and  economic  problem is too great  to be  encompassed by  the 
limited influence of agricultural structural policies.  'l'he  "Mezzogiorno" 
region of Italy is a  typical area where  something more  than mere  farm 
improvement  and  enlargement  is needed to  improve rural living standards. 
'fhis greater rural  atructural  improvement  Hill increasingly be  promoted 
in the future by  the Community's  Regional  Policy.  Final  agreement  on 
the Regional  Fund  at  the 1974  Paris  summit  meeting of  EEC  leaders 
means  that the  policy uill be brought  into action during 1975. 
One  of the major aims  of the Regional Policy - in the  depressed rural 
areaa at least - is to create more  jobs.  Money  from  the Regional  Fund 
vlill be allocated to  concerns uhich  can  prove that  they are establishing 
new  enterprises Hhich  Hill  provide  jobs  in depreased areas.  Regional 
Fund  money  Hill also be uaed to  improve  the phyaical structure of the 
Communi ty 1 s  regionn. - 19-
This will  involve  improvement  in roads,  railways,  power  lines,  water 
supplies  and the provision of all the structural  improvements  neces-
sary to revitalise an  econo~ically depressed region. 
The  Community  is to devote  £  125  millions to regional policy  in 1975 
and £  208 millions in each of the following two years. 
Incorporating important  elements  of both agricultural structural 
policy and regional policy is the  11Hill Farm  and Less  Favoured Rural 
Areas  Directive11 •  This  has been approved by  Council  and the areas 
which  are to benefit  have  now  been  decided. 
The  basic aim  of the hill farm  policy is to conserve the countryside 
through the  continuance  of farming in less favoured areas.  'rhe  new 
forestry directive is also designed to fit into the pattern of struc-
tural reform of rural areas. 
VII 
PROPOSALS  FOR  REFOillll  OF  THE  FARM  POLICY 
There  have  been many  official and unofficial  proposals for modifica-
tion of the  CAP.  The  Commission's  plans for bringing the management 
of the farm  policy into line with the needs  of the  consumer  and 
ensuring an  economically  sound agricultural structure v1ere  made  in 
November  1973  (M). 
One  of the main  points  of the Commission's  reform memorandum  was 
that,  in general,  a  system of direct  income  subsidies is not  a  valid 
(*)  11Newsletter11  :  special issue,  November  1973  ("Memorandum 
Agriculture 1973-1978 
11
). - 20-
alternative to the  present  market  price support  principle of the  CAP 
(this system  is in fact  used to  support  such special crops  as  durum 
wheat  and  olive oil).  The  Commission  argues  that  such a  policy would 
hold up  structural  improvement  of the aericultural  industry,  create 
administrative  problems  and lay too  heavy  a  burden  on  national budgets. 
The  memorandum  does,  however,  make  positive proposals  for the more 
effective alignment  of production with consumer  demand.  Il also makes 
recommendationn  for the reduction and  limitation of farm  price support 
costs. 
An  important  principle set  out  in the memorandum  is that  in future  farm 
prices should be  set  on  the basis of efficient farms.  At  the  sa~e time 
it is proposed that the  industry  should be  encouraged to become  more 
efficient  through the wider application of the various agricultural 
structural policies already agreed. 
The  Commission  has  also made  several positive proposals agreeing with 
the many  independent  suggestions for the better adjustment  of production 
to consumption. 
In the dairy sector the memorandum  proposed the institution of a  "surplus 
tax"  to be  levied  a~ainst farmers  and milk manufacturers  whenever there 
is a  danger of surpluses  becoming a  financial  and trading embarrassment. 
Similar policies are  currently proposed by  the  governments  of at  least 
two  member  States. 
And  in a  situation of reduced  demand  for butter,  the Commission  also 
proposed the alteration of the  price ratio between butter and dried 
skim mild.  Aim  of this measure  is to  encourage  production of the protein 
- rich dried milk - rather than fat. 
The  Commission  has  now  made  a  modified  proposal for the penalisiPg of 
dairy farmers  and manufacturers if surpluses become  excessive. 
Due  to unusual  climatic factors  dairy  product  surpluses decreased 
during 1974.  But  the  threat  of  expensive  surpluses remains.  Urgent - 21-
reform  action is still likely to be  needed if the  embarrassing butter 
surpluses  of two  and three years  ago are to be  avoided. 
Many  of the other specific market  sactor proposals  made  in the Memo-
randum  have  of course also been  overtaken by  events.  Changes  in the 
cereal policy - such as  abolition of the payment  of subsidies to 
convert  wheat  into animal  feed  (the so-called "denaturing premium")  -
have  since been forced  on  the Community  by  extreme market  forces. 
The  improvement  in the price ratio between  the main  animal  feed 
grains,  maize  and barley,  and the main cereal for human  food,  wheat, 
in order to  encourage  greater production of the feed grains,  has still 
to be  implemented.  So  also have the  proposals for a  permanent  l-Theat 
reserve to allow the Community  to play  a  greater part in vtorld food 
security programmes  as  well  as  to  ensure  EEC  consumers  against 
shortages. 
VIII 
CHALLENGES  TO  THE  UNIFIED  FARM  MARKET 
A major point made  by  the  Commission  in the  November  1973  Memorandum 
was  that  any  real  improvement  c.·f  the  CAP  is impossible without  a  e;reater 
move  towards  economic  and monetary unity within the Community. 
And  without  doubt,  the  events  of the last twelve  months  in the agricul-
tural  sphere  have  fully  supported this contention.  Disparities between 
national  needs  and  aims  and  those of the Commw1ity  as a  whole  have 
resulted in a  succession of crises which have  threatened to demolish 
the CAP. - 22-
During the past  three years monetary  imbalances between member  States 
have  increasingly disrupted smooth  running of agricultural trade. 
At  the beginning of 1974  there were  already monetary  compensatory  sub-
sidies and levies operating between  the three member  countries with 
currencies floating below the "central rate" - Italy,  the United 
Kingdom  and Eire.  'I' he  situation was  made  worse  in February 197 4  by 
an effective seven  per cent  devaluation of the French franc. 
There  was  also the problem  of the revaluation of the Deutsche-Mark 
and the Benelux currencies which  involved the application of addi-
tional compensatory  subsidies for  farm  produce  sold out  of these 
countries to the rest  of the  Community. 
Though  rationally justifiable,  these monetary  compensatory  subsidies 
have  in practice been  responsible for considerable distorsion of agri-
cultural trade (l). 
(1)  Monetary  compensatory  a'l'lounts: 
In order to achieve  a  completely  common  farm  market,  with all 
prices the  same  in different  countries,  farmers  must  be paid 
in a  special monetary unit  - the "unit of account".  If all the 
nine currencies of the  Community  did not  fluctuate  then this 
object  could easily be  achieved since conversion of the unit 
of account  into Deutschmarks  or Francs  would  always result  in 
the German  and French  farmer being paid the  same  amount. 
Unfortunately,  however,  national currencies are not  stable. 
When  a  country's currency is revalued,  as  in Germany,  farm 
pricen  should be reduced.  When  it is devalued,  ao  in France, 
farm  prices  ohould be  increased.  In the first case the unit  of 
account  "buys"  fewer  D~l  and  in the  second the u. a.  "buys"  a 
larger number  of FF. 
But  national  governmento  will  not  allow their prices to be 
altered to their true value  in relation to the unit  of account 
for  obvious political reasons.  Therefore,  without  some  adjust-
ment  at  the borders,  cheap  exports  from  the country with the 
devalued currency  can undermine the market  of the stable or 
revalued country.  Likewise,  the revalued country cannot  com-
pete in the devalued country.  It is therefore necessary to 
have  "compensatory  amounts"  paid and  charged at the border 
to compensate  traders for these differences. - 23-
Exports  of meat  and other animal  products  sold out  of Germany  and the 
Benelux countries to France,  Italy and the United Kingdom  were  indoub-
tedly responsible for further  depression of already depressed markets 
in these countries. 
The  major reason  for this distortion is that the monetary  uifferences 
between  countries  do  not  necessarily reflect  the actual costs of 
production or the market  prices ruling within them. 
This  distortion of trade was  a  major factor prompting the Italian 
govern~ent to  impose  50  per cent,  six-month deposits  on  all imports 
from  Community  countries  in Hay  197 4.  Import  deposits  imposed by 
the Italians were  removed  completely at  the  end  of 1974. 
Effective dismantling of most  of the monetary  compensation subsidies 
paid to other EEC  member  countries exporting to Italy was  a  major 
condition on  which  the Italian government  agreed to remove  its import 
deposit  system. 
The  man  who  exports  from  a  country with a  revalued or stable 
currency must  receive  a  subsidy to allow him  to compete  in 
the market  of the devalued country,  because his  goods  are 
more  expensive.  Similarly,  the  man  selling from  the devalued 
country  into the stable or revalued currency must  pay  a  levy 
in order to make  his  now  cheaper  goods  as  expensive as  those 
in the countries with the  more  valuable currencies.  These  mo-
netary  compensatory  amounts  are levied and paid at both  ends 
of  a  transaction - on  the way  out  of the exporting country 
and  on  their way  into the  importing country.  This  somewhat 
complex  system  has  to operate like this to  allow for the pro-
blems  of  goods  passing between countries vli th different pari-
ty relationshipG. It is particularly complex where  trade in-
volves  two  countries with devalued currencies.  Inevitably, 
this system is a  serious barrier to free trade  and prevents 
the  operation of  a  real common  farm  market.  The  MCAs  are 
incidentally operated from  Brussels and  any  deficit  (total 
levy  income  minus  subsidies)  in the cost  of operation is met 
from  the EAGGF. - 21-
IX 
I  CONCLUSION I 
Though  like all agricultural support  policies,  the  CAP  has major 
imperfections,  it has  proved to have  an unassailable advantage 
during the last two  years:  the ability to protect the European 
oonsumer  from  rapid increases in food prices resulting from 
shortages. 
Because it has  encouraged self-sufficiency in the major foods  - grain, 
meat,  dairy  products,  sugar and vegetables  (legumes)  - the  CAP  has 
ensured that through the rapid inflation of food prices on  the  world 
market  since 1972,  EEC  food prices have been stabilised. 
The  inability of the EEC  support  system to overcome  the problems 
of the  cycle of over  and under production of beef,  to control the 
overproduction of dairy products  and to stave off the threat of 
expensive surpluses of wheat  have been major targets of criticism. 
Fortunately however,  the political will to seek new  methods  of mana-
ging these markets  more  efficiently does  now  exist  in the Community. 
The  Commission's  plans for modification of the support policies in 
these sectors is receiving much  fuller support  from  member  govern-
ments  than they  have  done  in the past. 
There is also the possibility that the  economically stringent era 
which Europe  and the rest of the world is now  entering will force 
gre~ter economic  and monetary  cooperation.  This  could go  a  long w~ 
to solving the distortions of agricultural trade caused by  monet~ry 
imbalances between member  States. 
Though  criticised by  other agricultural exporting countries,  the 
EEC,  despite its high level of self-sufficiency,  still remains  the - 25-
world's major  importer of  food  products,  accounting for more  than 
40  per cent  of total world agricultural imports. 
And  it is likely that  with  increased cooperation with Mediterranean 
countries,  the African,  Caribbean and Pacific  group  of countries 
and  ceveral other trading groupe,  that  the  Community  will continue 
to  allow a  greater proportion of agricultural imports  into its mar-
kets. 
In  common  with all other developed countries  and  groups  of countries, 
the  EEC  doec  have restrictions on  agricultural imports.  But  it is 
doing more  to liberaliso this trade than most  other countries. 
The  major structural problems  of European agriculture remain.  Labour 
productivity and technical  efficiency on  average  lag behing the 
record of the  other major agricultural producers.  It must  be  borne 
in mind  however,  that  the geographical  features  of the Community  and 
the political and social problems  of the European agriculture indus-
try make  nonsense  of any  comparisons  with agricultural exporting 
countries  ouch  as  the  United States,  Canada  or Australia. 
Efficiency of the  French cereal farmer  is as good  and probably  greater 
than his American  counterpart;  the efficiency of the Scottish dairy 
farmer  approaches  that  of his  New  Zealand cousin;  beef production  in 
Europe  is,  in terms  of utilisation of home  produced feeds,  the  most 
efficient in the world. 
The  infertility of many  regions  of the Community,  the social  immo-
bility in many  rural areas all militate against  the  achievement  of 
the technical  efficiency of relatively newly  developed and climati-
cally favoured  countriec such  ao  the  USA  and  New  Zealand. 
Increasingly,  the  otructural and social aspecto of the agricultural 
policy,  combined  with  the regional policy will take care of the 
social obotacleo to  increaoed aericultural  efficiency. - 26-
Like all existing agricultural  support  policies the  CAP  is not 
perfect.  In common  with all other types  of food policy1  it has 
not yet  solved the  problem  of  how  to balance production with 
consumer  demand. 
It has  however  proved itself capable of protecting European  consu-
mers  from  food price inflation through the recent  period of world-
wide  food  shortage and  high prices.  The  European  farm  policy has 
achieved this highly desirable objective through giving food  pro-
ducers  the long term price guarantees that have  encouraged them 
to produce  adequate quantities of all the main  basic foods. 
Without  this security of food  supply,  food price increases and 
resulting wage  inflation would  have  been very  much  greater in the 
1973-74  period than they were. 